The Russian military is now stronger than the U.S. & NATO
Republication in response to Steve Jermy's article, "Right now NATO could not win a war against Russia"
I have chosen to republish this piece after reading an outstanding article titled "Right now NATO could not win a war against Russia" by retired Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jermy. His piece is compelling and concise, while my article expands on similar ideas in greater detail. I believe each piece is important on its own, but they both ultimately get across the same ideas. Please consider reading Cdre. Jermy’s piece here: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nato-war-with-russia/
The following is my article as originally published on 2nd January, 2025:
American & European strategists invited Ukraine and Georgia to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2008, then armed Ukraine with offensive weaponry starting in 2017. This was a huge mistake. Russia responded by kicking its military industries into overdrive and recruiting hundreds of thousands of troops. NATO is currently incapable of replicating this feat because Russia has economic privileges that make it uniquely capable of such a rapid transformation. I predict the West’s blunder will be looked back on by historians like Imperial Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor, in which they “awakened the sleeping giant.”1
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are now more powerful than the United States Armed Forces and NATO combined. This was not the case prior to the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia has since used this conflict as a launch pad for rapid military expansion. How is it possible that a country with the GDP of Texas achieved greater defense capabilities than all Western militaries combined?
My assessment is that February of 2024 was the turning point when Russia’s military became more powerful than NATO. This was when Russia won the Battle of Avdiivka2 and decisively defeated the Zaporizhia Offensive.3 Seeing these two events back-to-back indicated a big change in Russian defense capabilities since their retreats of 2022 and heavy losses in the Battle of Bakhmut. Instead of seeing more blunders, we witnessed Russia defeat the first blitzkrieg offensive since 1941 and capture Ukraine’s most heavily fortified choke point in Donbas within two months of each other. These victories paved the way for Russia’s now ongoing territorial captures, demonstrating tactical dominance and strategic foresight.
In a commentary, Wyatt Mingji Lim, the analyst behind Defense Politics Asia, listed changes in the Russian military during that period. It built 7,000 km of defensive fortifications and minefields, built thousands of kilometers of highway and rail lines, deployed 1,700 drone crews, built 440 military hospitals, multiplied ammunition production by seventeen times, and reduced weapon development times from several years down to a few months.4 Lim explains that NATO, by giving massive amounts of lethal aid to Ukraine, forced Russia to modernize and expand its military. He concluded that, based on these numbers, Russia is turning into a global superpower and that the U.S. will need its own peer-level land war to achieve the same level of development.
Lim is correct, and this change has gone unnoticed in the collective West where nationalist myths about U.S. and NATO military supremacy are still widely believed. This is not to say the U.S. and NATO are incapable of drafting forces, building trench lines, or commandeering factories. Obviously, if push came to shove, NATO member states could convert to wartime economies and establish formidable defenses like they did during World War II. This article merely takes a snapshot of current military capabilities, and finds that Russia has overtaken NATO. This should be a wakeup call to Western strategists seeking to enhance defense capabilities moving forward.
How to Measure Strength
I. Productive Capacity
The U.S. & NATO together have a significantly greater defense expenditure than the Russian Federation. Russia’s 2024 military budget was $115 Billion while NATO member’ combined budget was $1.27 Trillion, eleven times greater than Russia. Yet, this vast difference in spending has little bearing on defense capabilities for three reasons: (1) Purchasing power. (2) Economies of scale. (3) Contract price gouging. Because of each, producing weapons is significantly cheaper in Russia.
To find the difference in purchasing power, we must calculate input costs in the U.S. (the largest producer of weapons in NATO)5 versus Russia. In industrial manufacturing, input costs like labor, materials, and energy make up a substantial proportion of the total operating budget. These costs fluctuate significantly depending on cost of living and the market prices of metals and energy. However, based on corporate self reporting, we can assume baseline labor costs are ~16%, material costs are ~27%,6 and energy costs are ~7%,7 totaling to half of the operating budget of a typical industrial corporation. Therefore, the costs of these units can be used to extrapolate the baseline difference in purchasing power of each bloc’s defense procurement budget.
The 2023 household income per capita in Russia was $7,5008 while American income was $50,900.9 From this, we can assume that the cost of American labor is 6.78 times greater than the cost of Russian labor. Current Russian steel pricing is $529 per metric ton10 while American steel is $887 per metric ton,11 1.67 times more. Russian energy costs $0.05/kWh12 while American energy costs $0.15/kWh,13 exactly three times more. Averaging each unit proportionally reveals that with equal scales of production, we should expect Russian weapons to cost roughly 41% that of American weapons.14
Larger scales of production also reduce unit costs, so a smaller military budget can yield an equal or greater number of weapons. While stockpiles matter at the start of a war, productive capacity is more important for extended wars of attrition since sustainable volumes of weaponry and manpower are the means for victory.15 The category of weapons responsible for the most casualties in land war are explosives, with artillery being responsible for ~80% of casualties, including the Russo-Ukrainian War,16 earning its King of Battle title. Therefore, the units for comparison will be explosives, specifically artillery shells, bombs, missiles, and drones.
The following figures are the latest available open source estimates of weapon production by each bloc. Russia produces 250,00017 to 375,00018 large caliber artillery shells (152 mm) per month. NATO states together produce 83,800 to 125,80019 shells (155 mm) per month. Russia produces at least 3,50020 glide bombs (FAB & KAB) per month. NATO states together produce 70021 glide bombs (JDAM) per month. Russia produces 174 to 21322 offensive missiles23 per month. NATO states together produce 12924 offensive missiles per month. Russia produces 120,00025 FPV drones per month. It is unclear how many FPV drones NATO & Ukraine together produce, but it could be between 17,000 and 84,00026 per month. Russia produces 1,63327 large platform suicide UAV (Geran-2, Lancet) per month. NATO produces as many as 8328 intermediate platform suicide UAV (Switchblade) per month. Russia produces multiples more of each explosive weapon type than NATO: 3.5x the artillery shells, 5x the glide bombs, 1.5x the missiles, 2x the FPV drones, and 19x the larger suicide drones, a scale of weapons production 6.2 times larger. Considering Russia has significantly higher productive capacity than the collective West, it is likely their weapons have much lower unit costs due to economies of scale.
The weapons contract system used by the U.S. Department of Defense does not strictly enforce price gouging, and may indeed use monopolized contracts as an incentive for manufacturers. With a monopoly on the production of one type of weapon system needed by the DOD, manufacturers can charge whatever they want. This wastes a large portion of the procurement budget since taxpayer dollars are converted into corporate profit, which could be an intentional incentive structure to increase competition for contracts.
This system has resulted in a worsening burden on the budget from unsustainable price gouging. U.S. defense spending totals more than half of discretionary spending, and this proportion is increasing.29 The impact on weapon prices, however, is particularly alarming. An oil pressure switch that has a production cost of less than $328 costs the DOD $10,000. A shoulder-fired Stinger missile that cost $25,000 in 1991 now costs $400,000.30 Adjusted for inflation, it should only cost $58,000. The worst example is a bag of bushings, which could probably be procured from a hardware store for $100, instead costs the Air Force $90,000.31
The Russian Ministry of Defense, by contrast, appears to create profit incentives through higher output volumes rather than monopolization, investing in a firm’s ability to increase its scale of production. Russia previously purchased Shahed-136 drones from Iran, on which the Geran-2 design is based, for $200,000 per unit.32 While the exact procurement cost for the Geran-2 is unknown, the production cost is understood to be ~$25,000, significantly lower than the Iranian export price.33 Russian ammunition plants have multiplied their production of 152 mm artillery shells, resulting in a unit cost of $1,000,34 much lower than the $8,00035 price tag in NATO states caused by low supply and limited scales of production. Some Russian weapons have seen increased unit costs, like FPV drones increasing in cost by $3,00036 per unit with the addition of jam-proof fiber optic lines. However, Russian weaponry does not generally suffer from price gouging since scales of production have increased system-wide, organically increasing profit margins37 and removing the incentive.
Since Russian weaponry costs less than half that of Western weaponry by default, has six times the scale of production, and does not come with price gouging incentives, Russia is able to produce significantly greater quantities of weaponry for a fraction of the cost. Therefore, NATO’s greater budget has not earned it greater strength.
II. Speed of Adaptation
Russian weapon technology is quickly adapting to battlefield threats by developing practical, cheap, and increasingly lethal modifications. Additionally, in the realm of superweapons, according to the best available evidence, Russia currently has greater capabilities than the U.S. & NATO.
Russia’s diversification of specialized drone types has accelerated in the last year. They now use first person view (FPV) drones for various roles including anti infantry, anti tank, aerial interception, bombing, mining, and electronic warfare.38 They have also deployed non-jammable fiber optic drones in large numbers,39 bypassing electronic warfare devices that normally scramble wireless signals and blind drone feeds.
The Russian Air Force uses cheaply produced JDAM-style glide bomb kits that fit standard FAB bombs and KAB thermobaric vacuum bombs. These kits retrofit the large Soviet stockpiles of FAB and KAB bombs to have much longer ranges and much higher precision. These bombs have very large explosive yields, with the three thousand kilogram FAB-3000 regularly hitting Ukrainian positions and the gargantuan FAB-9000 having been used at least once.40 Given the large quantity of glide bombs deployed on the battlefield, particularly during the 2024 Battle of Avdiivka, Ukraine’s insufficient air defense coupled with the sheer quantity of these bombs have made them a lethal addition to the battlefield, and would likely be a serious challenge for Western forces in the event of a peer conflict given that their JDAM stockpiles have been drained by aid to the Israel Air Force. Israel has dropped in excess of 88,000 tons41 of JDAMs and other guided bombs in Gaza, the rough equivalent of five Hiroshima bombs.42 It is unknown what percentage of the NATO glide bomb stockpile has been given to Israel, but it is unquestionably substantial.
Many people assume that NATO member states secretly mass produce highly effective superweapons that could easily overwhelm Russian defensive capabilities. They possess very deadly technologies like the B-2 & B-21 stealth bombers, which could deliver significant blows during a peer conflict. However, the suggestion that NATO possesses secret serial production lines or deployment of classified superweapons appears to have no basis in reality. The U.S. & NATO are testing numerous experimental prototypes including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV)43 and directed energy weapons, but none of these systems have entered serial production, let alone service.
A directed energy weapon called the Epirus Leonidas, designed to disable drone swarms, won a contract with the U.S. Army. However, the company has only built four prototypes44 and is unlikely to produce enough units to protect the entire Army anytime soon. The Army has only recently begun fielding jammers to infantry units,45 but this is already too late considering Russia now uses non-jammable fiber optic drones. Wireless FPV drone operators can still successfully engage targets by simply ramming their drones through blind spots.46 Russia also uses real, battlefield tested superweapons already in serial production like the Kinzhal, Zircon, and Oreshnik, and is now fielding the Poseidon. While the U.S. & NATO are capable of eventually establishing production lines of HGV, directed energy weapons, & other superweapons, there is no evidence they have achieved this so far.
An area NATO is believed to have greater capabilities than Russia is precision tactical weaponry like GPS-guided Caliber shells, GMLRS systems like the HIMARS, GLSDB systems like the M270, and other “game changers.” However, since these systems have been used in Ukraine, Russia is now able to jam and intercept them,47 and has almost certainly developed a system for quickly assessing and adapting to the characteristics of unfamiliar systems. During the Gulf War of 1991, these expensive signal-guided tactical weapons were a huge advantage for the collective West, delivering it a decisive victory. However, on the modern battlefield, these weapons function as poorly as non-guided tactical weapons, rendering them overpriced and pointless. The winning strategy in modern warfare is to develop higher production volumes of cheap non-guided systems like rocket artillery and cheap guided systems like FPV drones.
III. Size of Standing Armies
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation currently numbers 2,219,000 active personnel with 1,330,000 soldiers,48 a recruitment rate of 30,000 per month,49 and an additional 1,500,000 reservists.50 The U.S. Armed Forces stand at 1,326,000 active personnel, 443,000 soldiers, a recruitment rate of 4,600 per month,51 and 806,700 reservists.52 NATO, including the U.S., stands at 3,471,200 active personnel53 with 1,395,290 soldiers,54 a recruitment deficit,55 and 2,414,000 reservists.56 In total, NATO has slightly more troops and substantially more reservists than Russia, but a fraction of the recruitment rate. The U.S. has the highest recruitment rate of any NATO member state, yet recruits 84% fewer troops per month than Russia.
NATO member states have six times the population of Russia and should hypothetically be able to conscript six times the manpower, thereby making it theoretically capable of winning a war of attrition against Russia. This is true, but there are a few reasons why current recruitment rates and force size are better measurements of potential military strength than population size and number of reservists. Calling up all available reservists and conscripts puts an enormous burden on the economy, as both Ukraine & Israel have discovered, so this move must be saved for true existential threats. Yet both blocs have nuclear deterrence, making a direct war unlikely. If reservists and conscripts were called up for World War III, a strategic nuclear exchange would likely occur before reservists and conscripts were trained up and ready for deployment. With a steady flow of recruits already in motion, the side with the higher pre-war recruitment rate will have an advantage in the first year of conflict since the other army will need more time to train. Additionally, each bloc would need to arm their respective militaries, and having the greater productive capacity in the short term will create an immediate advantage on the battlefield. Therefore, the current force size and recruitment rate of each bloc are better measurements of military strength.
The Russian Ministry of Defense uses pay incentives to increase recruitment levels. Its base pay is $2,100 per month.57 This is roughly four times greater than the national median income of $625 per month. For comparison, entry pay in the U.S. Army (E-1) is currently $2,017 per month,58 or less than half the national median income of $4,241 per month. If American soldiers were paid a proportionally equivalent rate to Russian soldiers, they would be earning $16,966 per month. This is a gargantuan sum, but it’s only a portion of their total earnings and incentives. They also earn large enlistment bonuses,59 regional cost of living adjustments,60 benefits like debt forgiveness,61 and cash rewards for destroying and/or capturing enemy equipment.62 Russian soldiers are paid slightly more than American soldiers in exact dollars, and at least eight times more when adjusted for cost of living, without even counting bonuses or benefits.
The sustainability of such high personnel costs has been questioned, but Russia’s personnel costs only comprises 10%63 of its total military budget while the U.S. personnel costs comprise 22%64 of the total American defense budget. Despite having three times the personnel, half the relative personnel budget, and one seventh the total defense budget, Russia literally pays its soldiers more than American soldiers are paid. This does not make sense mathematically, but it is true. This begs the question as to whether some portion of the American personnel budget is being misspent. It would be unsurprising if corruption was siphoning off a portion of the American personnel budget given how price gouging similarly affects the procurement budget. Localized problems are sometimes representative of system-wide problems, and that may be the case with corruption vis-à-vis U.S. defense spending.
In current numbers, the collective size of NATO’s standing armies are slightly larger than Russia’s, and its number of reservists is significantly higher. However, Russia’s recruitment numbers and incentive structure are better than NATO’s. The two factors, productive capacity and recruitment, are why many military analysts predict Russia will win the Russo-Ukrainian War65 and why I assess it is currently more powerful than NATO.
NATO members could hypothetically match or exceed Russia’s recruitment if they make a convincing case that they face an existential threat. The U.S. military enjoyed recruitment surges following the Pearl Harbor and September 11 attacks66 despite neither Japan nor Al Qaeda posing existential threats. Perhaps if Russia were to attack a NATO member or if a convincing false flag were staged, NATO could see a spike in recruitment that would give it a clear advantage over Russia in a war of attrition. It is important not to count on such a possibility, though, because nationalism is a much more powerful political force than liberal institutionalism.67
If a NATO ally is attacked, it could have some effect on recruitment, but it is unlikely to cause the same kind of recruitment surge seen when one’s own state is attacked because it would not automatically be perceived by the public as a national security threat. For example, if Russia attacks Latvia, there will certainly be a spike in recruitment among Latvians and their immediate neighbors like Lithuanians and Estonians. However, it is unlikely to convince citizens in distant allied states because not everyone considers an indirect threat worth dying over. A false flag attack, similar to the U.S.S. Maine Attack68 or the Gulf of Tonkin Incident,69 could potentially surge recruitment, but skepticism is likely to be strong in the age of democratized open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis.
IV. Experience and Quality of Training
Experience and quality of training are sometimes pointed to as evidence of NATO being more powerful than the Russian military. This was likely true prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine since NATO had fought a series of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions over thirty years, gaining experience for their many soldiers, airmen, and marines. Additionally, as someone who personally knows American infantry veterans, I have heard anecdotes about their extremely intense training, indicating NATO’s ability to prepare soldiers for land wars. However, no training can substitute the practical experience gained from real high intensity combat. By that measurement, the Russian military is now, by far, the most experienced and best trained military in the world. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, at least 650,000 Russian troops are now experienced in combat,70 and new troops are regularly rotated in, further raising this figure.
This measurement is why I do not consider the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to be more powerful than the Russian military despite exceeding it in some measurements of strength including size of forces and productive capacity. The PLA has not engaged in high intensity combat since the 1984 Battle of Laoshan against Vietnam. The PLA seems unlikely to win a land war against Russia given its current level of experience. That could change with enough time and adaptation in a protracted war of attrition, especially since China has a much larger population, but a quick Chinese victory would be unrealistic to expect given the combination of Russia’s already substantial experience level, force size, and productive capacity. Additionally, like NATO, China has nuclear deterrence, making a China-Russia war unlikely.
Some NATO troops have gained peer land war experience by joining the International Legion and Georgian Legion to fight alongside Ukrainian forces. It is unclear how many volunteers were NATO veterans, but the total number of foreign fighters could be as many as 32,500 combatants.71 Assuming that each of these members is a NATO veteran and has since returned to active duty or advisory roles with NATO (neither of which are likely), the number of NATO troops experienced in peer combat would total a mere five percent of Russia’s. Since NATO forces are exclusively experienced in COIN warfare, they are not guaranteed to make good tactical or strategic decisions in peer land wars. For example, the choice by NATO war planners to have Ukraine conduct a blitzkrieg attack, an antiquated and historically ineffective tactic, led to a major strategic defeat during the 2023 Zaporizhia Offensive.
V. Tactics
The 2023 Zaporizhia Offensive72 was the first demonstration of what occurs when the productive capacity and military tactics of Russia and NATO go head to head in a ground war. While it was not a direct battle between the two armies, which would be risky given their nuclear parity, it was a test of material and tactical capabilities of each military since NATO leaders and tacticians heavily armed, trained, and planned the offensive for five months prior to its start.73 Each military’s tactical doctrine could have changed following this offensive, so it may not be a good predictive case study for future engagements. Nonetheless, it is one of the only existing case studies.
The offensive used a tactic called blitzkrieg, in which a large combined arms force conducts a big arrow maneuver against the enemy’s defensive fortifications. Since there are too many targets for defenders to engage, many attackers break through and capture territory. According to historical military analysis by Professor John Mearsheimer, the blitzkrieg tactic has only worked once in a fair fight.74 That battle was the 1940 Battle of France in which German forces bypassed France’s impressive defensive fortifications, the Maginot Line, by crossing through the undefended Belgian-French border. According to Mearsheimer, no other blitzkrieg has ever succeeded in a fair fight.75 It is reasonable to predict that a NATO blitzkrieg against Russia will also fail. We should, however, analyze Russian tactics to better understand how they were able to defeat the 2023 offensive.
Three Soviet-era tactics, layered defenses, maskirovka, and deep battle doctrine, were each repurposed for Russian defenses and contributed to its tactical victory. The 1943 Battle of Kursk is a good primer for understanding layered defenses and maskirovka. The Red Army constructed several layers of defensive fortifications that absorbed and stalled the German blitzkrieg, a tactic repeated in Zaporizhia in 2023 when Russian forces constructed the similarly dense Surovikin Line. Maskirovka means “deception,” an ancient tactic at least as old as the 5th Century BCE when Sun Tzu described it. The Red Army used fake radio signals to deceive German forces into thinking their offensive would occur in one area of the Kursk salient, then they instead attacked a different area.
Maskirovka is challenging to pull off in the modern battlefield since intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) like satellite imagery can detect large troop build ups. However, Russian forces were able to effectively use maskirovka to defend against the Zaporizhia offensive. Ukrainian forces launched a massive artillery barrage against the Surovikin Line before launching their offensive, expecting they would kill Russian forces manning the lines. However, each defensive line was built North of a tree line where Russian personnel hid in until after artillery preparation had ceased. Russian forces were then able to re-man the lines and kill all advancing infantry and armored vehicles.
Figure 1: Kursk 1943 defensive lines.76
Figure 2: Zaporizhia 2023 defensive lines.77
Deep battle doctrine, which can be analogized as “death by a thousand cuts,” involves heavy artillery and air preparation followed by small unit penetration from multiple directions to capture territory. This contrasts the large, obvious armored columns that Ukraine used in the 2023 offensive and which Russia previously used during its initial invasion of 2022. Russian forces effectively utilized deep battle tactics to recapture Robotyne, the main settlement Ukraine had gained from its 2023 offensive, and have since used it to steadily capture Ukrainian territory including Avdiivka, Ocheretny, and Niu-York.
Despite the ISR density of the modern battlefield, these three tactics remain highly effective. Blitzkrieg, conversely, does not. If the U.S. and NATO expect to win future peer conflicts, they will need to update their battle doctrine to reflect Russia’s current tactical advantages.
VI. Power Projection
Power projection comes in the form of sea power, air power, and land power. In terms of sea and air power, NATO has a clear advantage over Russia. Russia has one aircraft carrier while NATO members together have seventeen. Russia has ten foreign military bases while NATO members together have more than a thousand. Russia is unable to compete with the West in naval warfare and is not capable of invading or occupying territory in the American hemisphere. However, the relevance of naval force projection in the 21st Century is questionable given recent technological innovations in weaponry that target the vulnerabilities of carriers and air bases.
Modern carrier fleets are considered unsinkable because of their layered air defenses and armor, but this appears to be false. A missile fired by Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis) bypassed nearly all air defense systems in a carrier fleet, being taken out by a warship’s last AD gun (Phalanx CIWS) with mere seconds remaining.78 A saturation strike using missiles and drones could destroy the warships in a carrier strike group. While the carrier itself has armor that could withstand missile strikes, Russia recently deployed a new underwater drone system (UUV) called Poseidon, which has an extremely large payload capacity. The Poseidon diagrams indicate that the warhead compartment is large enough to carry a one-hundred megaton nuclear warhead,79 twice the payload of the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated.80 If a conventionally-armed Poseidon hit a carrier, it could potentially sink it. However, if it was a nuclear warhead, the entire carrier would instantaneously vaporize.
NATO air power has a clear numerical advantage over Russian air power, possessing over 22,308 military aircrafts81 compared to Russia’s 3,464.82 However, the effectiveness of aircraft over a Russian battlefield is questionable given that Russian air defense systems are highly effective, according to Western militaries and think tanks,83 and are densely layered across its land borders.84 In the event of an aerial attack by NATO aircraft, it is likely a substantial portion would be destroyed by Russian air defense systems. Western air bases also have a significant conventional vulnerability with the introduction of Russia’s Oreshnik missile. The Oreshnik is a non-interceptable hypersonic IRBM with thirty-six or more independently targetable warheads.85 An Oreshnik could destroy any airfield in Europe within eighteen minutes of launch.86 This weapon has kinetic energy warheads that each deliver ~400 kg of explosive force, making its total explosive yield greater than 14 tons of TNT.87 This is one and a half times more energy than the FAB-9000, one of Russia’s largest conventional munition.88 After detection of a saturation attack using Oreshniks, a few jet aircraft could get airborne within the small time frame, but the remaining aircraft would likely be destroyed. Russia appears to have developed sufficient countermeasures to overcome Western naval and air power capabilities.
In terms of land power projection, Russia has a strategic advantage over NATO members: its location. In 1904, Halford Mackinder wrote that Russia possesses the greatest strategic position of any territory on Earth because it is located in the “heartland” of Eurasia,89 allowing it to project land power in any direction: Europe, West Asia, South Asia, or East Asia. The heartland also has easily defensible geographic barriers to its East and its South, allowing Russia to focus the bulk of its defenses in the West. The Ural mountains can serve as fallback positions that Russian forces can retreat to if an invasion force were to capture western Russia. Because of its advantages, outside empires have felt extremely insecure about Russian power and often become irrationally90 devoted to destroying or weakening it.
Figure 3. Mackinder’s map of Eurasia.91
Typically, Western empires that seek to weaken or destroy Russia by land end up weakening or destroying themselves due to logistical overextension. Napoleon Bonaparte’s army lacked sufficient supplies to fight or even survive during the retreat of 1812. Of Napoleon’s 600,000 strong invasion force, 150,000 were killed by Russian forces and an additional 350,000 were killed by disease, malnutrition, or cold weather. Adolf Hitler’s invasion force was much larger at 3,800,000 troops. A significant portion of Germany’s logistics were diesel powered since they needed to transport heavy trucks, tanks, and large caliber artillery guns, which cannot be transported by horse. Logicians warned German leadership that the army could reach 1,000 kilometers into Soviet territory before running out of fuel reserves. Sure enough, each army group reached roughly 1,000 km into Soviet territory before being caught dead in their tracks, allowing Soviet forces to consolidate infantry and artillery, and proceed to decisively defeat Germany over the next two years. Based on historical examples, initiating land wars against Russia is strategically unwise because non-heartland empires do not possess the resources, logistical capabilities, or strategic wisdom to out-compete Russia.92 Therefore, proxy wars have since been the approach to weakening Russia.
Figure 4. French occupation of Russia in 1812.93
Figure 5. German occupation of the USSR in 1941.94
Mackinder describes the marginal crescent as territories that surround the heartland. Anglo-American empires have used proxy armies in the marginal crescent to contain Russia. Arming the Mujahideen proxy force was surprisingly effective at overextending the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This intervention is widely believed to have contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.95 Crescent proxies have since been the main Western strategy to weaken Russia. The West supported anti-Russian separatists in Chechnya through the CIA,96 armed anti-Russian rebels in Syria using the CIA,97 and openly armed Ukraine prior to the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War.98 The Russian security establishment perceived these actions as strategic threats to its territorial integrity, border security, and warm water ports, and took the bait to intervene in each case.
Western empires also succeeded at weakening Russia by conquering portions of Ukraine. During the Crimean War of 1853, the British Empire occupied a portion of the Russian Empire through Crimea. In 1941 during Operation Barbarossa, German forces invaded Soviet territory through Ukraine. These events engendered a high degree of paranoia regarding Western influence in Ukraine and other critical crescent territories like Georgia. They will fight to the end to prevent distant superpowers from exerting influence or stationing forces in Ukraine. Because of Russia’s convictions and its material advantages, President Barack Obama observed in 2016 that Russia has “escalatory dominance,”99 a wise and important lesson that has since been forgotten by Western leadership.
Pushback
When presenting the hypothesis that Russia is now more powerful than NATO, I typically get the following responses: (1) The ground truth reality in Ukraine and Kursk indicate that Russia is much weaker than NATO. (2) Unlike Russia, the United States is capable of defeating and conquering its neighbors. (3) The West could defeat Russia by going after its centers of gravity: petroleum & manufacturing. (4) In an actual war against NATO, Russia would get wiped out by nuclear weapons.
I. Ground Truth Reality
There are several ground truths that appear to indicate Russian military weakness. Those are the 2022 withdrawal from Kyiv, the 2022 retreat from the right bank of Kherson Oblast and most of Kharkiv Oblast, greater attrition against Russian forces than Ukrainian forces, the 2023 Wagner Group mutiny, the 2024 Kursk incursion, the 1,000+ day duration of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the alleged 2024 introduction of North Korean infantry into Kursk Oblast. What problems do these events actually indicate, and has Russia attempted to resolve them?
In April of 2022, Russian forces withdrew from the northern front. This occurred during the Istanbul peace talks, and was claimed by Russian leadership to be an “act of goodwill” to facilitate the talks.100 Both parties initialed the terms of the peace agreement, and were ready to sign upon their next meeting.101 However, Prime Minister Boris Johnson showed up to Kyiv, and allegedly convinced President Zelenskiy to abandon the agreement, which he soon did.102 By April 12, Putin said the talks had reached a dead end. Some have interpreted the “gesture of goodwill” claim to be a propaganda cover for a retreat since the Russian presence in the North was unsustainable. There is no evidentiary basis for this interpretation.
Later in 2022, Ukrainian forces launched offensive operations on the Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts, during which they successfully recaptured half of each. The Russian positions were insufficiently defended, being manned by dispersed police units which Ukrainian forces were able to overcome before the arrival of Russian reinforcements. Part of the issue was many Russian forces had reached the end of their contracts and went home, reducing the force size available for the war in Ukraine. This alerted the Russian General Staff of the need to increase manpower. They ran a partial mobilization of reservists, then later raised recruit wages and substantially boosted recruitment advertising. They also changed contract terms, renewing each contract automatically for the remainder of the war. These decisions resulted in Russia gaining manpower superiority, allowing each part of the frontline to be sufficiently defended.
Every casualty estimate in the Russo-Ukrainian War appears to be fictitious, ranging anywhere from 1:16 to 20:1 depending on who you ask. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claims Russian casualties exceed 700,000 while Ukrainian casualties are a mere 43,000. The Russian Ministry of Defense claims Ukrainian casualties are 1,000,000 and Russia’s are 48,000.103 U.S. and other Western estimates also typically claim Russian casualties to be twice those of Ukrainian casualties.104
There is zero evidence to support any of the casualty estimates published regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War. Casualty estimates are almost always manipulated to push a political agenda, those of successful friendly defenses and unsuccessful enemy defenses. The most obnoxious examples from history are Germany’s exaggeration of Soviet losses in WWII,105 the United States’ exaggeration of Vietnamese losses during the Vietnam War,106 and Israel’s current exaggeration of Hamas losses,107 with each putting enemy losses orders of magnitude higher than friendly losses.
During the Russo-Ukrainian War, publications sometimes silently redefine the term “casualty” to hide friendly losses and exaggerate enemy losses. If friendly “casualties” only count KIA (killed in action) while enemy “casualties” include both KIA and WIA (wounded in action), then it can give the appearance that enemy losses are orders of magnitude greater than friendly losses. I had an email exchange with a New York Times reporter whom I will not name, in which I told him I noticed deceptive casualty figures in his article. He replied by claiming they were classified Department of Defense figures, a politically motivated figure of equal uselessness to a random number generator.
If estimates are useless, then how do we find a realistic casualty exchange ratio? We must exclusively use the KIA figures that are verified by name. Using this methodology, we can extrapolate that the casualty exchange ratio is almost exactly 1:1 with 67,354 Russian KIA and 63,627 Ukrainian KIA.108 While the verified counts are incomplete, they probably represent the real casualty exchange ratio somewhat correctly given that Russia and Ukraine regularly exchange their dead.109 It is unlikely, however, that the number of Russian losses exceed Ukrainian losses since artillery is responsible for eighty percent of casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War,110 and the side with artillery superiority usually deals greater casualties to its enemy. One example is 1944’s Operation Bagration when the Red Army had artillery superiority over German forces. That battle resulted in 180,000 Soviet KIA (killed in action) and nearly 400,000 German KIA,111 a casualty exchange ratio of 2:1 in the Red Army’s favor. Therefore, given Russia’s artillery superiority throughout the Russo-Ukrainian war,112 it is unlikely the actual number of Russian casualties exceeds the number of Ukrainian casualties. Nonetheless, there is no evidentiary basis to conclude that either army’s casualties are significantly greater than the other’s, especially not by multiples.
The 2023 Wagner mutiny was a surprising turn of events, and resulted in several deaths. It indicated a lack of contingency planning on the part of the Russian Armed Forces and a surprisingly strong Wagner PMC. Valery Prigozhin, the head of Wagner, conducted the mutiny on the basis that he believed the Russian Ministry of Defense had intentionally deprived his units of artillery ammunition during the Battle of Bakhmut, leading to the deaths of many of his contractors, and that they had secretly ordered the Russian Army to attack his units. The situation was resolved diplomatically within one day, and Prigozhin was later assassinated, likely in retaliation for the mutiny. This event represents a massive break in command and cohesion, one that the General Staff has likely since incorporated into its contingency planning.
The Kursk incursion in August of 2024 was a surprise offensive using operational secrecy and large numbers of infantry and armored vehicles hidden in forested areas. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy claimed capturing the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) was never the aim of the incursion, but says Ukraine could have easily captured it if they had tried.113 Analyst Alexander Mercouris made the point that once you translate this quote from double speak to plain English, it is an admission that capturing the KNPP was precisely the goal of the incursion. A map of the incursion shows it went directly toward the KNPP and got nearly halfway before being stopped, increasing the likelihood that capturing the plant was the strategic objective. This objective was not achieved since Russia was quickly able to deploy its elite drone units, equipped with non-jammable drones, and kill infantry and armored vehicles sent into Kursk.114
Figure 6. Direction of Kursk incursion (arrow); location of KNPP (circle).115
Regarding the 1,000+ day duration of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the temporal length of conflicts have no bearing on their outcomes. The Chinese Civil War went on for over twenty-two years, with the communists coming very close to defeat during the Long March, yet they eventually won the war. The Afghan War went on for twenty years, and for much of that time, few military analysts expected a decisive Taliban victory. In 2024, the Syrian Arab Army lost the Syrian Civil War in a mere week despite having controlled the majority of the country for eight years. Additionally, given the high density of surveillance drones and stand off strike systems in the Russo-Ukrainian War, we should expect territorial capture to occur slowly since big arrow maneuvers like the Zaporizhia Offensive usually turn into turkey shoots. Whether Russia wins tomorrow or in ten years is of no relation to their level of military strength.
Some have argued North Korean infantry were brought to Kursk out of necessity due to unsustainable attrition against Russian forces. At the time of this article’s publication, there is still no evidence that North Korean troops are operating in Kursk. Images of Asian-looking faces are not evidence given that at least 5% of Russia’s population are indigenous East Asians.116 I happen to believe North Korean artillery units are operating in Kursk due to videos showing North Korean artillery pieces being transported in Western Russia.117 Russia and North Korea also recently signed a defense treaty, making mutual territorial defense legal under international law.118 Additionally, it would make sense for North Korean forces to gain high-intensity combat experience if they ever plan to restart the Korean War. Despite these clues, though, there is no direct evidence North Korean forces are operating in Kursk, nor that they have participated in combat. It is possible the entire hysteria surrounding North Korean troops in Kursk is simply a disinformation campaign.
In sum, while these ground truth contexts are certainly public relations disasters for the Russian military, they are not indicative of weakness. These events highlighted deficiencies that forced the Ministry of Defense to make big changes including increasing wage incentives for recruits and reducing reliance on PMC. With each new blunder, Russia establishes contingencies and eliminates vulnerabilities, making it a more powerful force.
II. Canada and Mexico
Whether a superpower’s neighboring state is easily conquerable depends on specific contexts. The U.S. Army could easily conquer Canada within a matter of days. The vast majority of Canada’s population lives within one hundred miles of its southern border, and the U.S. Army has infantry, artillery, and air superiority over the Canadian Army. However, the U.S. would be unable to conquer Mexico since it has a heavily armed population, militias experienced in battle including the use of FPV drones,119 and complex terrain like mountains and jungles. Each of these contexts would make a war to conquer Mexico a protracted counterinsurgency nightmare for the U.S. Army.
Contexts in Ukraine, similarly, have made the invasion a massive headache for Russia. Ukraine, at the start of the conflict, had the largest land army in Europe, had lethal aid delivered to it by NATO for several years prior, and a large contingent of ideological extremists in its armed forces. Ideological extremists, such as neo-nazis in the Azov Brigade and Aidar Battalion, are very good fighters because they are highly motivated and already have a foundation of hating and dehumanizing the enemy, allowing them to easily handle the emotional toll of killing. This normally takes an extraordinary amount of social engineering and propaganda to achieve in volunteer/conscript armies like Russia’s. Each of these contexts has made the Russo-Ukrainian War a complex challenge for the Russian Army that any powerful army would face if they attempted a similar operation.
III. Center of Gravity
Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the Center of Gravity has become increasingly relevant in modern warfare with the proliferation of stand off strike systems like missiles and drones that can remotely target a military’s center of gravity, which is where its power derives from. Russia gains considerable tax revenue from fossil fuel exports and uses a substantial portion of it to build weapons. It could be credibly argued that Russian industries, like petroleum and weapons, are Russia’s center of gravity.
Ukraine has sought to destroy as many fuel refineries and weapon production facilities as possible using drones and missiles. The large number and geographic distribution of refineries and factories make it logistically impossible to destroy all or even most of them. Russia has thirty major refineries and numerous smaller ones, making Russia the third largest refining state after the U.S. & China.120 Drone strikes on refineries temporarily slowed production, but had no permanent impact on the energy industry or its exports since the refineries were quickly repaired.121 The maximum range of Western missiles given to Ukraine is 300 kilometers,122 insufficient to hit the majority of Russian refineries and weapon factories spread out across its vast territory.123 It is also impossible for strikes to have a meaningful impact on the Russian arms industry given that it has over six thousand arms production firms.124 Since Ukraine began hitting Russian territory with drones and missiles, Russian advances on the battlefield have continued unabated.125
Other approaches to stifling Russian energy and weapons production have been similarly ineffective. A state actor, probably either the U.S.126 or Ukraine,127 destroyed the Nord Stream pipelines. The Western bloc implemented several rounds of sanctions including the oil price cap plan. Ukraine recently shut off the gas pipelines running from Russia and through Ukraine.128 None of these efforts appear to have affected Russian fossil fuel revenues, as Europe has increased its maritime imports of Russian liquid natural gas129 and the TurkStream and BlueStream pipelines through Turkey still send Russian energy to Europe. Demand from alternate customers also remains high, problematizing the premise that energy sanctions by the West could work.130 Efforts to target Russian semiconductor imports to stop missile and drone production have also been ineffective since Russia produces its own semiconductors for its weaponry.131
The European strategy of cutting off Russian energy was not only unworkable, but also politically suicidal for establishment political parties. European industries have become dependent on Russian energy for growth and sustainment. When sanctions against Russian energy took effect, energy prices exploded.132 This is a problem for industrial exporters like Germany, as skyrocketing energy prices have caused them to shut down factories at historic rates.133 This has accelerated the already evident shift toward nationalistic, anti-institutionalist parties in Europe.134
Some publications claim energy prices have nothing to do with this shift and that suggesting as much is “Kremlin propaganda” designed to re-open energy taps.135 Yet, for economies in threat of recession and households required to pay higher heating and electricity bills, energy prices have a tangible impact on day-to-day life. Choosing to support parties with pragmatic energy policies, like Alternative for Deutschland’s promise to extend the operation of nuclear power plants,136 is a rational choice for voters who see the writing on the wall. Perhaps some European voters do indeed seek to empower Vladimir Putin, but in truth, the majority simply want to strengthen their economies and lighten the burden on their wallets.
Efforts to attack and sanction Russian fossil fuels and weapon manufacturers have not succeeded, and are unlikely to succeed. Given their volume, geographic distribution, and layered air defense shield, destroying Russia’s center of gravity is infeasible. With the high demand for energy and Russia’s ability to circumvent sanctions, non-kinetic means to hit Russia’s center of gravity are also infeasible.
IV. Nuclear Deterrence
Superpowers are unlikely to go to war with one another thanks to nuclear deterrence. Russia and NATO each possess several thousand strategic nuclear weapons and hypersonic delivery systems like ICBM, MIRV, and HGV. Neither NATO nor Russia possess enough anti-ballistic missile interceptors to defeat the volumes of nuclear weapons that would be used in the event of an all-out strategic nuclear exchange.
Five to six interceptors are required to have an eighty percent chance of intercepting one strategic nuclear warhead.137 The U.S. has 1,389 nuclear weapons in active service while Russia has 1,458.138 It would take a minimum of 7,847 interceptors to defeat the U.S. nuclear arsenal and 8,237 to defeat the Russian nuclear arsenal.139 The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) only possesses forty-four GMD interceptors140 and the Russian Space Forces only have one S-500 regiment in service.141 These are the only two deployed systems in either military capable of intercepting ICBM. The MDA claims to have developed new advanced interceptors capable of defeating MIRV and distinguishing decoys from warheads, but a deployable prototype is not expected to be ready until 2028 at the earliest.142 Since neither side possesses anywhere near the required volumes of interceptors, a strategic nuclear war between the two blocs is guaranteed to be apocalyptic.
To best understand what a strategic exchange would look like, Annie Jacobsen’s book Nuclear War: A Scenario has a detailed scientific explanation of exactly how destructive such a scenario would be. It is deeply grim, effectively guaranteeing the majority of the Northern hemisphere being sent back to the Stone Age.143 It is a miracle this has not occurred yet, and geostrategists should keep it that way.
It is possible the two blocs could engage in limited direct wars, and Western powers have indeed expressed interest in directly intervening to protect both Ukraine144 and Taiwan.145 However, these interventions would be extremely risky. The Pentagon declassified a series of fifteen war games with China over Taiwanese independence. Nuclear weapons were used in ten scenarios, and three of them resulted in a strategic nuclear exchanges.146 That represents a twenty percent chance of a nuclear apocalypse in the event of a war between the U.S. and China, an uncomfortably high likelihood for such a destructive event. That makes a Western intervention on behalf of Taiwan literally irrational. Professor John Mearsheimer argues that if Russia were to perceive an imminent loss in Ukraine, it would likely use nuclear weapons in an attempt to save the situation. Therefore, a Western intervention on behalf of Ukraine would also be irrational. Similarly, it would be irrational for China or Russia to attempt to station troops in Mexico since the U.S. would likely retaliate with nuclear weapons. Therefore, any direct war between any set of superpowers is inherently strategically irrational.
Lessons
Americans and Europeans should not be scared of Russia. If you do not attack a strong enemy, and it has no incentive to attack you, then you do not have a reason to be afraid. Modern Russian leadership is observably unreactive, with routine provocations by the U.S. & Europe going ignored.147 Therefore, as long as the U.S. does not pose an existential threat to Russia, it is unlikely to attack the U.S. or NATO.
Nonetheless, the revelation that the balance of power has suddenly shifted in Russia’s favor should serve as a wake-up call for the West. The U.S. and NATO will need to shape up their defense establishments if they wish to remain defensible in what will likely be a future of high intensity proxy wars, especially given the newfound trend by non-nuclear nations (Gaza & Ukraine) of invading their nuclear-armed neighbors (Israel & Russia).
Correction: An error was made in calculating the explosive yield of the Oreshnik missile, comparing its explosive force to a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon. This was incorrect, and overrepresented its force by orders of magnitude. It is closer to a very large conventional bomb like the FAB-9000.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Professor Nelson for critical feedback that led to the idea for this article.
ChatGPT was utilized to find some sources.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto's_sleeping_giant_quote
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Avdiivka_(2023%E2%80%932024)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ukrainian_counteroffensive
Of all NATO member states, the U.S. produces and exports the most weapons. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry
https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/pbl-2014-share-of-raw-material-costs-in-total-production-costs_01506.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.businessinsider.com/chart-the-cost-of-manufacturing-stuff-2013-4?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/russia/annual-household-income-per-capita
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-states/annual-household-income-per-capita
Russian hot rolled coil steel currently costs 56,000 Rubles, the equivalent of $529.67. https://www.mzstal.ru/pricelist/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.investing.com/commodities/us-steel-coil-futures?utm_source=chatgpt.com
American steel is measured in short tons, so I converted it to cost per metric ton. One short ton of American hot rolled coil steel currently costs $730 per short ton. A short ton is 2,000 lbs and a metric ton is 2,204.62 lbs.
730 / 2000 = 0.365
0.365 * (2204.62 / 2000) = 0.40201
0.40201 * 2204.62 = 887
One metric ton of American HRC steel is $887.
https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/Russia/electricity_prices/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/electricity_prices/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
For this calculation, I used 100 units of U.S. input cost as the baseline to determine what value of Russian input has the same purchasing power.
u == input unit; al == American labor; rl == Russian labor; am == American materials; rm == Russian materials; ae == American energy; re == Russian energy
al = 16 * 2 = 32 u; rl = al / 6.78 = 4.71 u
am = 27 * 2 = 54 u; rm = am / 1.67 = 32.33 u
ae = 7 * 2 = 14 u; re = ae / 3.00 = 4.66 u
4.71 + 32.33 + 4.66 = 41.7 total Russian u
Russian input costs are 41.7%, or <1/2 American input costs.
https://totalmilitaryinsight.com/war-of-attrition/
https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-the-race-to-rearm-could-decide-who-wins-the-conflict-12817694
The U.S. claims to have a monthly output of between 40,000 and 80,000 shells.
European NATO member states claim to have a combined output of 550,000 shells per year, or 43,800 per month.
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/09/why-theres-no-easy-answer-russias-glide-bombs/399402/
https://www.boeing.ca/products-and-services/defense-space-security/joint-direct-attack-munition
132 - 171 offensive missiles of X-101, Kalibr, & Iskander types, plus 10 X-32, 6 Kinzhal, 1 Zircon, and 25 Oreshnik ballistic missiles, totaling between 174 and 213 per month.
https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-intel-russia-produce-300-oreshnik-year?utm_source=chatgpt.com
This figure excludes air defense missiles like those used in the Patriot and S-300 systems.
42 ATACMS, 11 Tomahawks, 8 HIMARS, 60 JASSM, 8 Taurus, 0 Storm Shadow, & 0 Scalp, totaling 129 offensive missiles per month.
https://thedefensepost.com/2024/12/24/raytheon-tomahawk-block-v/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
1,333 Geran-2 and Gerbera type, & 300 Lancets (estimate based on battlefield usage) produced per month.
https://www.newsweek.com/pentagon-defense-price-gouging-weapons-1801875
https://www.shopify.com/blog/economies-of-scale
https://t.me/ClashReport/25720
https://imemc.org/article/shocking-statistics-on-day-450-of-the-israeli-genocide-in-gaza/
The Little Boy used in Hiroshima is understood to have been the rough equivalent of 15 kilotons of TNT. 88000 / 15000 = 5.86.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypersonic_Technology_Vehicle_2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epirus_Leonidas
https://journal-neo.su/2024/06/03/buried-in-steel-military-production-natos-proxy-war-in-ukraine/
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-raises-russian-military-strength-202241647.html
International Institute of Strategic Studies (February 2024). The Military Balance 2024. Pp. 190. https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/army/2024/09/army-rebounds-from-recruiting-slump-slightly-exceeds-target-goals/
IISS. Pp. 36.
USA 485,000 + Turkey 402,000 + France 118,000 + Germany 100,000 + Italy 100,000 + UK 82,040 + Greece 100,000 + Slovenia 7,300 + Luxembourg 950 = 1,395,290 soldiers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_equipment_of_NATO
https://www.ft.com/content/f9dc7922-8d5c-4f29-90f3-6a5d27311c1c
https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/16/why-are-european-armies-struggling-to-recruit-soldiers
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-soldiers-contract-army-moscow-income-putin-1931428
https://www.military-ranks.org/army/private-pay
https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/24/europe/russia-moscow-troops-signing-bonus-intl-hnk/index.html
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-troops-get-bonuses-destroying-western-tanks-2023-06-16/
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-hikes-national-defence-spending-by-23-2025-2024-09-30/
https://www.pgpf.org/article/budget-explainer-national-defense/
https://www.newstatesman.com/comment/2024/12/the-year-ahead-2025-russia-win-war-in-ukraine
https://www.foxnews.com/us/9-11-military-recruiting
https://mises.org/mises-wire/how-world-embraced-nationalism-and-why-its-not-going-away-soon
“The available physical and historical evidence overwhelmingly indicate Maine was destroyed by an accident inside the ship [...] If the physical evidence for a mine is lacking, the historical evidence is non-existent.” https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/Recent/Article-View/Article/3290776/why-did-the-uss-maine-explode/
“There was not a second attack on U.S. Navy ships in the Tonkin Gulf in early August 1964. Furthermore, the evidence suggests a disturbing and deliberate attempt by Secretary of Defense McNamara to distort the evidence and mislead Congress.” https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2008/february/truth-about-tonkin
https://tass.com/defense/1723781
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Legion_(Ukraine)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Legion_(Ukraine)
This offensive is colloquially referred to as the “2023 Ukrainian Counteroffensive,” which I find to be a confusing name since it was not a counteroffensive. I substitute my own term in this article.
Biden’s Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stated during the 2023 Kyiv Security Forum, “Even as you plan for the counteroffensive, which we have been working on with you for some 4-5 months, we are already beginning our discussions with [the] Ukrainian government and with friends in Kyiv – both on the civilian side and on the military side – about Ukraine’s long-term future.” https://www.azerbaycan24.com/en/us-has-been-preparing-ukrainian-counteroffensive-for-months-nuland/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
A fair fight is a battle involving two roughly equal militaries.
a year ago · 451 likes · 336 comments · John J. Mearsheimer
https://fr.pinterest.com/pin/440930619746083314/
https://defensepoliticsasia.com/ukraine/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Bomba
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293754/nato-aircraft-strength-type/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_Russian_Air_Force_aircraft
Air Force General Gorenc: Russia air defense has “closed the gap.” https://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/russians-closed-the-gap-for-a2ad-air-force-gen-gorenc/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Stratfor: “The S-400 is highly effective.”
RUSI: Russian AD can “keep NATO air power at arm’s length.”
https://static.rusi.org/20191118_iads_bronk_web_final.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
IISS: The S-400 “should not be underestimated.”
National Interest: The S-500 will give Russia a “noticeable advantage.”
The distance from Bryansk Oblast to Portugal is 3,656 km. The speed of the Oreshnik is 12,300 kph. 12300 / 3656 = 3.36. 60 / 3.36 = 17.85.
https://news-pravda.com/world/2024/12/30/947092.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FAB-9000
Mackinder, Halford. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal.
I say “irrational” because it has never succeeded and is extremely unlikely to succeed in the future. The Soviet Union fell because of internal economic mismanagement, not by being “defeated” as President George H.W. Bush boasted. This paranoia and unspoken jealousy of Russia also leads western elites to be russophobic. Russophobia is a form of race essentialism and white supremacy that most western elites ascribe to despite their profuse insistence that they are anti-racist.
This was one of the central goals of the French Empire, the British Empire, the Third Reich, and the United States. In seeking to destroy or weaken Russian power during the Napoleonic Wars, the intervention in the Russian Civil War, World War II, and the Russo-Ukrainian War, each opposing empire was instead weakened or outright destroyed.
https://aworldatwarunderstandingwwii.weebly.com/uploads/4/8/1/2/4812021/9470433_orig.gif
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequences_and_legacy_of_the_Soviet-Afghan_War
https://www.eurasiareview.com/11092023-cooperation-of-cia-and-al-qaeda-in-chechen-wars-analysis/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_aid_to_Ukraine_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
https://ukranews.com/en/news/847382-withdrawal-of-troops-from-kyiv-is-goodwill-gesture-peskov
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wehrmachtbericht?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War_body_count_controversy?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68387864
Regular army troops verified by name to have been killed in action are as follows: Russians KIA, excluding PMC combatants and PMC inmate volunteers, total 67,354. https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng-trl
Ukrainian KIA, excluding PMC and foreign volunteers, total 63,627. https://ualosses.org/
Both figures are likely undercounts, but they are the only verified evidence that can be credibly used to claim a realistic casualty exchange ratio, which is 1.05:1 in Ukraine’s favor, or ~1:1.
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-exchange-fallen-soldiers-bodies-november-2024/33195044.html
https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-the-race-to-rearm-could-decide-who-wins-the-conflict-12817694
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/30/7482129/
https://www.sofx.com/russia-deploying-fiber-optic-drones-in-kursk/
https://deepstatemap.live/en"#9/51.3410380/35.2029419
Tatars, Bashkirs, Buryats, & Kalmyks together make up 4.7% of Russia’s population. https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/russian-culture/russian-culture-population-statistics?utm_source=chatgpt.com
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202412050001?pageSize=100&index=1
https://apnews.com/article/mexico-cartel-attack-guerrero-drones-helidoro-castillo-ed795770ce9a09b1c063d91913268b99
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/15/7451330/
ATACMS have a maximum range of 300 km, and Storm Shadows have a maximum range of 250 km.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry_of_Russia
https://www.newsweek.com/video-biden-saying-end-nord-stream-resurfaces-after-pipeline-leak-1747005
https://tass.com/economy/1891143
https://ieefa.org/european-lng-tracker-september-2024-update#section5
https://hir.harvard.edu/germanys-energy-crisis-europes-leading-economy-is-falling-behind/
Alternative for Deutschland. (2017). Manifesto for Germany. Federal Party Congress. Pp. 82. https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017-04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf
5.65 interceptors are needed per warhead to guarantee an interception of an ICBM. To have an 80% chance of intercepting 20 warheads, 113 interceptors need to be fired. 113 / 20 = 5.65. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/wgd02/index.html
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nuclear-weapons-by-country
1389 * 5.65 = 7847.85. 1458 * 5.65 = 8,237.7.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10541
https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-first-regiment-s500-long-range-air-defence
Jacobsen, A. (2024). Nuclear war: A scenario. Dutton.
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/12/22/2003828891
Examples include long range missile strikes on pre-2014 Russian territory by U.S. & NATO personnel. Since operation of these systems requires classified targeting data and preparation by trained NATO personnel, it can be credibly argued this is a direct act of war against Russia by the U.S. & NATO. However, Russia’s responses to these attacks have not yet included directly attacking the U.S. & NATO, instead limiting their responses to Ukrainian targets.
Thanks, great article! However, this part: "This weapon has kinetic energy warheads that each deliver ~400 kg of explosive force, making its total explosive yield more than 14 kilotons." is incorrect. 400 * 36 = 14 400 kg = 14.4 tons not kilotons. While Oreshnik is indeed a formidable weapon because it gives Russia an ability to disable large air and naval bases without going nuclear, it is not as formidable.
You got a big shout out today from Alexander Mercouris at the Duran.