Thank you so much for this detailed consideration on this very difficult intelligence problem. We live in a hall of mirrors controlled by powerful liars and I appreciate those who can dispassionately reason through the reflections of the spectacle. Here’s my one comment that might justify a much higher Ukraine to Russian casualty rate: the much higher rate of Russian artillery fire and the fact that it has been that way for about two years. I seem to recall reading a piece in 2023 from RUSI by Alex Vershinin which put Russian artillery fire at 6x or more than Ukraine. Thanks for your consideration. I’ve been sharing your pieces with all my friends.
I actually do not really disagree with your methodology or the logic supporting it, I would, however, like to offer some additional reasons why I believe the casualty figures overall favor Russia over Ukraine by more than 1.5.
It is not just an artillery advantage that Russia has enjoyed, though it is certainly the most pronounced during different stages of the war. They have also enjoyed a standoff munitions advantage since nearly day one - Ukraine used up almost all of their upgraded Tochka-U (Scarab B I believe is what NATO calls it) during the openly months, and the majority appear to have been shot down.
During the same period, Russian commanders were using Kalibrs and Iskander strikes with reckless impunity and the Ukrainians lacked anything credible to shoot them down. In fact, in AD during the opening states it had probably been 7 years since any of their Russian systems - some legacies from the USSR period - had been serviced by the proper technicians or hard their parts replaced, which were required I believe every 2 to 3 years or the system would begin a terminal decline in performance.
This is not counting the other platforms that the Russians used that were older but no-less deadly and accurate against the static lines and fortifications of the UAF: repurposed naval missiles, older cruise missiles, older ballistic missiles, unguided rockets of all kids, MLRS and on and on. Russia enjoyed a categorical advantage in all of these departments very nearly from day one.
The NATO alliance did try to supplement the Ukraine with stuff like the Excalibur and the GBU kits, but as even Western media had to admit, their effectiveness nose-dived against the superior Russian EW systems (Excalibur going from 95%~ or so effectiveness down to as low as 5%). The Russian EW has also been effective against even modern munitions like SCALP and even HIMARs strikes, and Ukraine has had absolutely no counterpart to this from the beginning of the war.
Russia also began using Shahed/Geran early on, and while some counter measures certainly have been deployed to some effectiveness, the endless, daily and nightly waves of these drones have led to destruction of targets nearly every time they are deployed.
Finally, Russia has enjoyed Air Superiority virtually practically from the entire war, with systems like Patriot only able to barely tilt things in the UAF's favor. Russia has basically had a free hand to use FAB-250s - the most effective ones they have so far - as much as they desire against completely helpless static targets, and have been able to deploy their Mi-28 and Ka-52's with near impunity since the start.
Do not even get my started on Lancets, or Kubs, or Orlans, or the FPV drones that seem to have been used in favor of Russia since the start.
When all of that is added together, it just seems to me that not-withstanding actual face-to-face combat by infantry and armor, that Ukraine is definitely suffering far more casualties in this conflict than the Russians are - how much is the debate. Personally? I think all things considered, counting PMC and everything, the ratio is 3.5:1 in favor of Russia. Without PMC I think it is closer to 5:1.
Right on casualties, but then double or triple it based on survival rates. Ukraine is fighting with an average age over 40, and since 2023 there have been no volunteers, only conscripts.
They get minimal training even on basics like how to stop a colleage from bleeding to death.
And then Russia has withdrawn from every town or city it has been pressurised in. It has simply avoided any battle where it was likely to lose similar numbers to Ukraine. But Ukraine and doubled quadrupled and more on every village it was losing.
10x (for deaths), 3 times for wounded is not just reasonable - it would be quite incredible if it were only at that level.
Three missing factors come to mind to consider, but I don't know how one could assign numbers to them.
1.) The frequent large-scale cruise missiles and drone attacks deep behind the front lines by the Russians does not have a comparable from the Ukraine side.
2.) Russian air superiority and the high number of large precision-guided FAB bombs they drop daily does not have a comparable on the Ukrainian side.
3.) The many obliterated cities we see were occupied by Ukrainian solders while they were getting obliterated, not Russian soldiers.
best guess would be 1m Ukrainians KIA, 1m wounded,
Russia 100k and 300k.
If side A shells 3-10x as much as the other then casualties are going to be 5-10 times worse for side B.
If side A gives 6 months training for every volunteer (or 3 months for returning reserves) and Side B gives 5 weeks for Nato trained conscripts and 5 days for other conscripts then wounded to KIA
going to be 3:1 for A, and 1:1 for B.
Especially given side B is recruiting mostly men 40+, has no time to give them proper first aid training (stopping blood lose is critical), has limited mobility to move wounded about behind the front line, and had little or no air cover.
And then tactics. Side A has withdrawn rapidly from every confrontation which it could not easily dominate (Kherson, izium, all over). Side B has thrown men after men after men into towns and villages which has already been defeated in order to delay withdrawal.
It really would be quite remarkable if Side B did not have 10x the KIA of side A.
Thank you for the feedback. Regarding first aid training, I recall from reviewing battlefield footage of the 2023 Zaporizhiya Offensive that Ukrainian mechanized infantry were well trained in the use of tourniquettes following landmine injuries. This was a long time ago, so AFU first aid training may not be as consistent now as it was then. However, based on that footage, I was under the impression they were well trained with first aid. If you have information to the contrary, please link it here for me to review.
1. That is propaganda battlefield footage - we know full well how Kiev curates all the footage that is released.
2. there is a ton of comment about conscripts turning up at the front after 5 days - surely you are not asking me to provide that.
3. Safe to assume that much of the 2023 army (ahead of the offensive at least) had survived since 2022 and received both initial training and subsequent retraining. But as you surely are aware, many units have had over 100% replacements since then. Few well trained soldiers remain.
I think what you are missing is not alternative sources, just a healthy dose of scepticism when observing stories out of Kiev.
I'd be curious what your view is to tactics, and the deliberate attempts by Kiev to hold towns at almost any cost against any disadvantage, compared to the willingness by Russia to cut and run early with few losses at all.
I think it was Izium when the best the Kiev media could find was Ukraine troops laughing at how the Russians ran (ie they failed to kill anyone).
Excellent question. I noticed a difference in strategic planning between generals Zaluzhny and Syrsky. I think Zaluzhny was much more pragmatic with his use of forces, but I think they would be even wiser to initiate peace talks. Here's why:
Zaluzhny refused to conduct offensives and instead preserved manpower for manning defensive lines, until he was essentially forced to for the 2023 Zap offensive. When Syrsky came in, he quickly agreed to demands to use manpower for offensives like Kursk. This was a huge mistake. These offensives have drained trained manpower and are part of why Russia has gained so much territory in the last two years. If I were the president of Ukraine and was tasked with preserving as much territory as possible, I would take Zaluzhny's approach by ceasing all offensive operations, thereby preserving manpower for defense. However, I would also initiate peace talks since a peace agreement would maximize land retention by ceasing further Russian captures.
... pretty much every single battle in 3 years has seen Ukraine trying to hold positions under pressure and sacrificing men to do so, including advanced positions during the offensive and Kursk.
Pretty much every Russian loss has been through early withdrawal with no battle.
In which battles did Ukraine not sustain casualties of 4-5 times the Russian number (and KIA much greater)?
It seems to me in None of them.
(of course some people have taken Kiev "meatgrinder" claims about Russian casualties at face value, but it is pretty clear that these were always about covering up the true nature of the war).
And then Glide Bombs and flame throwers - two very common Russian weapons. How many wounded do they leave behind - not many I think.
The more one investigates the nature of the war in Ukraine the clearer it is that Ukrainian deaths must be enormous - and in line with the Russian estimates,
"If I were the president of Ukraine and was tasked with preserving as much territory as possible,"
I think we all know Zelensky was being managed by members of Nato (we can debate which) and domestic villains. He has not been rational.
The only common thread in Ukrainian strategy has been a determination to avoid telling the world that they have already lost.
Syrsky of course was nicknamed the Butcher even before he took over from Zaluzhny. Butcher of his own men, nicknamed by his own men.
Hi, thanks for the question. UALosses and Mediazona count obituaries and social media posts to verify losses by name. Cemetaries are certainly a strong clue, but many people die from natural causes, car crashes, etc. Soldier's graves tend to be decorated with flags and other ornaments, but I cannot be certain whether they were soldiers. If I were in Ukraine, I would try to visit each new cemetary and check the grave stones for indicators.
Clearly the scale of cemetary imagery in Ukraine shows that estimates of <100k Ukrainian dead must be false, but doesn't help answer the question of whether it is half, one or one and a half million.
There are obviously reports on the Ukrainian side of massive AWOL, MIA numbers and just failures to report KIA/MIAs by military commanders who continue to collect wages.
So if we take seriously the supposed urgent need for 500k more Ukrainian conscripts, the 600k or so that started in 2022 and the several million recruited so far, there must be at least 2 million, maybe more that have left the Ukrainian forces.
Dead, AWOL and wounded.
All those MIA mean obituary data for Ukaine is going to be a massive underestimate, no body no obituary.
On the other hand obituary data for Russia is likely to be a good estimate. (Though Mediazona uses a multiplier to go from obituary count to estimated deaths. No need for that.)
Most Ukrainian deaths are part of a long term retreat making body recovery difficult. The Russian period of retreat was rapid, and included very little direct conflict.
Thank you so much for this detailed consideration on this very difficult intelligence problem. We live in a hall of mirrors controlled by powerful liars and I appreciate those who can dispassionately reason through the reflections of the spectacle. Here’s my one comment that might justify a much higher Ukraine to Russian casualty rate: the much higher rate of Russian artillery fire and the fact that it has been that way for about two years. I seem to recall reading a piece in 2023 from RUSI by Alex Vershinin which put Russian artillery fire at 6x or more than Ukraine. Thanks for your consideration. I’ve been sharing your pieces with all my friends.
I actually do not really disagree with your methodology or the logic supporting it, I would, however, like to offer some additional reasons why I believe the casualty figures overall favor Russia over Ukraine by more than 1.5.
It is not just an artillery advantage that Russia has enjoyed, though it is certainly the most pronounced during different stages of the war. They have also enjoyed a standoff munitions advantage since nearly day one - Ukraine used up almost all of their upgraded Tochka-U (Scarab B I believe is what NATO calls it) during the openly months, and the majority appear to have been shot down.
During the same period, Russian commanders were using Kalibrs and Iskander strikes with reckless impunity and the Ukrainians lacked anything credible to shoot them down. In fact, in AD during the opening states it had probably been 7 years since any of their Russian systems - some legacies from the USSR period - had been serviced by the proper technicians or hard their parts replaced, which were required I believe every 2 to 3 years or the system would begin a terminal decline in performance.
This is not counting the other platforms that the Russians used that were older but no-less deadly and accurate against the static lines and fortifications of the UAF: repurposed naval missiles, older cruise missiles, older ballistic missiles, unguided rockets of all kids, MLRS and on and on. Russia enjoyed a categorical advantage in all of these departments very nearly from day one.
The NATO alliance did try to supplement the Ukraine with stuff like the Excalibur and the GBU kits, but as even Western media had to admit, their effectiveness nose-dived against the superior Russian EW systems (Excalibur going from 95%~ or so effectiveness down to as low as 5%). The Russian EW has also been effective against even modern munitions like SCALP and even HIMARs strikes, and Ukraine has had absolutely no counterpart to this from the beginning of the war.
Russia also began using Shahed/Geran early on, and while some counter measures certainly have been deployed to some effectiveness, the endless, daily and nightly waves of these drones have led to destruction of targets nearly every time they are deployed.
Finally, Russia has enjoyed Air Superiority virtually practically from the entire war, with systems like Patriot only able to barely tilt things in the UAF's favor. Russia has basically had a free hand to use FAB-250s - the most effective ones they have so far - as much as they desire against completely helpless static targets, and have been able to deploy their Mi-28 and Ka-52's with near impunity since the start.
Do not even get my started on Lancets, or Kubs, or Orlans, or the FPV drones that seem to have been used in favor of Russia since the start.
When all of that is added together, it just seems to me that not-withstanding actual face-to-face combat by infantry and armor, that Ukraine is definitely suffering far more casualties in this conflict than the Russians are - how much is the debate. Personally? I think all things considered, counting PMC and everything, the ratio is 3.5:1 in favor of Russia. Without PMC I think it is closer to 5:1.
Right on casualties, but then double or triple it based on survival rates. Ukraine is fighting with an average age over 40, and since 2023 there have been no volunteers, only conscripts.
They get minimal training even on basics like how to stop a colleage from bleeding to death.
And then Russia has withdrawn from every town or city it has been pressurised in. It has simply avoided any battle where it was likely to lose similar numbers to Ukraine. But Ukraine and doubled quadrupled and more on every village it was losing.
10x (for deaths), 3 times for wounded is not just reasonable - it would be quite incredible if it were only at that level.
The populations in the respective countries know what's cooking.
In Russia, people sign up voluntary (but for high wages)
In the Ukraine, people are trying to flee the draft.
That just about gives me all the information I need. No further details necessary.
Mind you, I do appreciate this article. More light is always better.
Great analysis. Thank you.
Three missing factors come to mind to consider, but I don't know how one could assign numbers to them.
1.) The frequent large-scale cruise missiles and drone attacks deep behind the front lines by the Russians does not have a comparable from the Ukraine side.
2.) Russian air superiority and the high number of large precision-guided FAB bombs they drop daily does not have a comparable on the Ukrainian side.
3.) The many obliterated cities we see were occupied by Ukrainian solders while they were getting obliterated, not Russian soldiers.
You ought to be watching Andre martyanov in his smoothiex12 YouTube. He latest shows Kremlin figures you too can find likely at kremlin.en I guess.
There are well over a million killed Ukranians. There are like an 100,000 Russians. Kill ratio. Ten to one for Russia favor.
There are likely twice as many killed as these officials figures, A M regularly states.
You can't be serious about believing anything from the scAmerica sponsored UkroNam see eye hAy....
Other than when you talk numbers like this, I find your reports to be useful.
But you just have the wrong sources for numbers , why not check Russia?
The latest exchanges of prisoners are at least ten UkroNam sic for each Russian returned...
Ukranians were getting slaughtered at the rate of like 2000 or so a day for months.
Now running out of men, tis only half that lately
What is the artillery ammo ratio ? How many FAB per day ? How many losses by a FAB ? How many FAB losses per year ?
I think the russian firepower advantage must lead to far greater attrition on the ukrainian side.
https://youtu.be/jvbd6HAziaE?t=1391
Doug McGregor on Tucker Carlson.
120k Russians and allies, 1.2m Ukrainians. Dead.
Carlson has the second highest watched program in US (after Joe Rogab).
The "secret" is out.
Pretty naive I'd say.
best guess would be 1m Ukrainians KIA, 1m wounded,
Russia 100k and 300k.
If side A shells 3-10x as much as the other then casualties are going to be 5-10 times worse for side B.
If side A gives 6 months training for every volunteer (or 3 months for returning reserves) and Side B gives 5 weeks for Nato trained conscripts and 5 days for other conscripts then wounded to KIA
going to be 3:1 for A, and 1:1 for B.
Especially given side B is recruiting mostly men 40+, has no time to give them proper first aid training (stopping blood lose is critical), has limited mobility to move wounded about behind the front line, and had little or no air cover.
And then tactics. Side A has withdrawn rapidly from every confrontation which it could not easily dominate (Kherson, izium, all over). Side B has thrown men after men after men into towns and villages which has already been defeated in order to delay withdrawal.
It really would be quite remarkable if Side B did not have 10x the KIA of side A.
You need a re-think.
Thank you for the feedback. Regarding first aid training, I recall from reviewing battlefield footage of the 2023 Zaporizhiya Offensive that Ukrainian mechanized infantry were well trained in the use of tourniquettes following landmine injuries. This was a long time ago, so AFU first aid training may not be as consistent now as it was then. However, based on that footage, I was under the impression they were well trained with first aid. If you have information to the contrary, please link it here for me to review.
1. That is propaganda battlefield footage - we know full well how Kiev curates all the footage that is released.
2. there is a ton of comment about conscripts turning up at the front after 5 days - surely you are not asking me to provide that.
3. Safe to assume that much of the 2023 army (ahead of the offensive at least) had survived since 2022 and received both initial training and subsequent retraining. But as you surely are aware, many units have had over 100% replacements since then. Few well trained soldiers remain.
I think what you are missing is not alternative sources, just a healthy dose of scepticism when observing stories out of Kiev.
I'd be curious what your view is to tactics, and the deliberate attempts by Kiev to hold towns at almost any cost against any disadvantage, compared to the willingness by Russia to cut and run early with few losses at all.
I think it was Izium when the best the Kiev media could find was Ukraine troops laughing at how the Russians ran (ie they failed to kill anyone).
Excellent question. I noticed a difference in strategic planning between generals Zaluzhny and Syrsky. I think Zaluzhny was much more pragmatic with his use of forces, but I think they would be even wiser to initiate peace talks. Here's why:
Zaluzhny refused to conduct offensives and instead preserved manpower for manning defensive lines, until he was essentially forced to for the 2023 Zap offensive. When Syrsky came in, he quickly agreed to demands to use manpower for offensives like Kursk. This was a huge mistake. These offensives have drained trained manpower and are part of why Russia has gained so much territory in the last two years. If I were the president of Ukraine and was tasked with preserving as much territory as possible, I would take Zaluzhny's approach by ceasing all offensive operations, thereby preserving manpower for defense. However, I would also initiate peace talks since a peace agreement would maximize land retention by ceasing further Russian captures.
... pretty much every single battle in 3 years has seen Ukraine trying to hold positions under pressure and sacrificing men to do so, including advanced positions during the offensive and Kursk.
Pretty much every Russian loss has been through early withdrawal with no battle.
In which battles did Ukraine not sustain casualties of 4-5 times the Russian number (and KIA much greater)?
It seems to me in None of them.
(of course some people have taken Kiev "meatgrinder" claims about Russian casualties at face value, but it is pretty clear that these were always about covering up the true nature of the war).
And then Glide Bombs and flame throwers - two very common Russian weapons. How many wounded do they leave behind - not many I think.
The more one investigates the nature of the war in Ukraine the clearer it is that Ukrainian deaths must be enormous - and in line with the Russian estimates,
"If I were the president of Ukraine and was tasked with preserving as much territory as possible,"
I think we all know Zelensky was being managed by members of Nato (we can debate which) and domestic villains. He has not been rational.
The only common thread in Ukrainian strategy has been a determination to avoid telling the world that they have already lost.
Syrsky of course was nicknamed the Butcher even before he took over from Zaluzhny. Butcher of his own men, nicknamed by his own men.
Very interesting analysis. What are your thoughts about extrapolating from obituaries and cemetery imagery?
Hi, thanks for the question. UALosses and Mediazona count obituaries and social media posts to verify losses by name. Cemetaries are certainly a strong clue, but many people die from natural causes, car crashes, etc. Soldier's graves tend to be decorated with flags and other ornaments, but I cannot be certain whether they were soldiers. If I were in Ukraine, I would try to visit each new cemetary and check the grave stones for indicators.
Clearly the scale of cemetary imagery in Ukraine shows that estimates of <100k Ukrainian dead must be false, but doesn't help answer the question of whether it is half, one or one and a half million.
There are obviously reports on the Ukrainian side of massive AWOL, MIA numbers and just failures to report KIA/MIAs by military commanders who continue to collect wages.
So if we take seriously the supposed urgent need for 500k more Ukrainian conscripts, the 600k or so that started in 2022 and the several million recruited so far, there must be at least 2 million, maybe more that have left the Ukrainian forces.
Dead, AWOL and wounded.
All those MIA mean obituary data for Ukaine is going to be a massive underestimate, no body no obituary.
On the other hand obituary data for Russia is likely to be a good estimate. (Though Mediazona uses a multiplier to go from obituary count to estimated deaths. No need for that.)
Most Ukrainian deaths are part of a long term retreat making body recovery difficult. The Russian period of retreat was rapid, and included very little direct conflict.
WW3 Coming Soon
https://theendtimeisnow.substack.com/p/ww3-in-bible-prophecy?r=34pslr